As I was reading about Bismarck last night, I couldn't help but think that he reminded me of someone. Then, I read zak p's blog post and all became clear.
I completely agree that Bismarck "ruled" with Machiavellian principles at the root of his decisions. Thinking back to the lion/fox metaphor that were talking about last semester, it is clear that Bismarck completely fulfilled these criterion. As a lion, he didn't shy away from war, encouraging change through "Iron and Blood." As a fox he successfully manipulated competing nations (Austria, Denmark, and France) to move against one another, almost like playing a game of tic-tac-toe. At the same time, he also worked to appeal to the working-class man, always trying to appear as though he was working for the underdog (as briefly discussed in class).
The more I read, the more respect I gained, but also lost, for him. On one hand, his political mind is unparalleled (at least when compared with previous rulers we have learned about this year). Yes, many before him ruled with great authority, but none was so clearly manipulative. On the other hand, I could not help but think, who on earth would do such things? Falsifying documents, breaking agreements...
And then I thought about the Zimmerman Telegram, another case in which (although not falsified) a document played a key role a nation's declaration of war.
Similarly, in class today, many of us (yours truly included), delved into wily ways. While many of us forgot about public opinion, Bismarck obviously had thought that out, fulfilling a Machiavellian expectation. Setting aside the matter of dressing up Prussians as Austrians and launching "defensive" against the "aggressors," why did we all turn to deception? Was it just spitting back out the textbook? Could the Prussian/Austrian/French(/Danish) conflicts have been resolved in a way other than war?
Showing posts with label Prussia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Prussia. Show all posts
January 26, 2009
January 21, 2009
Power of (to?) the People
Nationalism is not something learned. Pledging allegiance to a piece of fabric cannot possibly create nationalism, nor can being encouraged to "take a more active role in civil service" (Western Civilizations, Coffin & Stacey, 746). Nationalism, instead, comes from the people.
In the case of Prussia in the early 19th century, with reforms aiming to "revive 'patriotism and national honor and independence,'" the interference of the government in the domain of the citizen did not bode well. Encouraging nationalism in your country's people does not automatically boost the popularity of a regime. In fact, this is exemplified in the 1840's when Prussians rose up against the government, criticizing the lack of political freedom.
Similarly, Tsar Nicholas attempted to manipulate nationalism to curry favor among the people. This, however, had a definite downside, as it meant alienating the people who were not pro-Slav. Nationalism is only a stage on which other issues come to play. Yes there were empires, but within these empires existed minorities (the book would like you to read "liabilities to autocratic control"). In this sense, ruling a country could not be taken as a cookie-cutter process. All citizens were not the same, nor had the same wants. Even beyond the racial/ethnic divisions, there were also political divisions, complete with subgroups.
Popular rebellion is difficult to control, but often can be effective should the rebels pull their act together in a cohesive argument. In the case of Frederick William in 1848, the strength of the Prussian revolutionaries bullied the king into capitulating
And with popular rebellion often comes a sense of nationalism ("the sense of belonging to a community that shares historical, geographic, cultural, or political traditions" [Ibid.,745]). When fighting for a common goal (should the goal indeed be common, at least in the greatest sense), a certain camaraderie arises among the individuals. However, even this can be held back by the aforementioned divisions, be them political or ethnic.
What rebels need to be successful is a clear focus, a singular thing around which to orient their fight, and an integral part in determining this goal. For Hungarians, this was Lajos Kossuth, who played an integral part in strengthening the popular rebellion by adding the forces of some lower aristocracy.
In the case of Prussia in the early 19th century, with reforms aiming to "revive 'patriotism and national honor and independence,'" the interference of the government in the domain of the citizen did not bode well. Encouraging nationalism in your country's people does not automatically boost the popularity of a regime. In fact, this is exemplified in the 1840's when Prussians rose up against the government, criticizing the lack of political freedom.
Similarly, Tsar Nicholas attempted to manipulate nationalism to curry favor among the people. This, however, had a definite downside, as it meant alienating the people who were not pro-Slav. Nationalism is only a stage on which other issues come to play. Yes there were empires, but within these empires existed minorities (the book would like you to read "liabilities to autocratic control"). In this sense, ruling a country could not be taken as a cookie-cutter process. All citizens were not the same, nor had the same wants. Even beyond the racial/ethnic divisions, there were also political divisions, complete with subgroups.
Popular rebellion is difficult to control, but often can be effective should the rebels pull their act together in a cohesive argument. In the case of Frederick William in 1848, the strength of the Prussian revolutionaries bullied the king into capitulating
And with popular rebellion often comes a sense of nationalism ("the sense of belonging to a community that shares historical, geographic, cultural, or political traditions" [Ibid.,745]). When fighting for a common goal (should the goal indeed be common, at least in the greatest sense), a certain camaraderie arises among the individuals. However, even this can be held back by the aforementioned divisions, be them political or ethnic.
What rebels need to be successful is a clear focus, a singular thing around which to orient their fight, and an integral part in determining this goal. For Hungarians, this was Lajos Kossuth, who played an integral part in strengthening the popular rebellion by adding the forces of some lower aristocracy.
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